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The Impersonal Superadditive Cosmology 
Zornitsa Dimitrova
This article positions the concept of the event 
within a cosmology that affirms its status as an un-
derlying liminality that precedes being yet is ad-
ditive to the processes that constitute ontologi-
cal regions. Across a number of event theories, the 
article shows how the event is systematically de-
fined as an impassive extra-ontological entity that 
is external in its relation to being yet conditions its 
emergence. That is to say, the discussed event the-
ories create a world picture in which the event is 
the impersonal superaddition to being. An event 
here is the intermediary, the interface, the ground-
lessness between world regions. As such, it func-
tions as an extra-categorical element within being. 
Herein the impersonal event becomes the protag-
onist of a superadditive cosmology wherein it con-
ditions the very emergence of constituted entities. 
The event becomes the impassive linkage be-
tween regions of being (Martin Heidegger), or the 
realm preceding, underlying, and generating being 
(Alfred North Whitehead and Gilles Deleuze). In 
what follows, then, I look at the story of the event 
from a cosmological vantage point and explore this 
pre-personal superadditive status.
COSMOLOGY HEIDEGGER DELEUZE WHITEHEAD SUPERADDITION
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An interview from 1988 later published in Negotiations documents one of 
Deleuze’s long-standing fascinations: «I’ve tried in all my books to discover the 
nature of events. It’s a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the 
verb ‘to be’ and all its attributes» (Deleuze 1995, 141). At the same time, one is 
unable to formulate a uniform, systematic theory of the event. The concept re-
mains invariably present but under different guises, explained in divergent ter-
minologies or contemplated from different access points. ‘Sense’, ‘sense-event’, 
‘event of sense’, ‘the expressed’ and even ‘expression’ are the terms that come to 
the fore most often. On contemplating the diffuse deleuzian event, I find a scope 
of borrowings and infusions from neighboring philosophical discussions that is 
striking. At the same time, leading event theories share many of Deleuze’s ide-
as about the ontological portrait of events as impersonal underlying forces that 
condition the genesis of representation. The ontological priority and relation-
al nature of “appropriation” in Heidegger and Whitehead’s “ingression” all con-
stellatorily intertwine to form a unified concept. Rather than being a radically 
new monolithic mould, however, this concept takes shape out of the conjunc-
tion points between existing event theories and articulated intuitions about the 
nature of events. A similar line of thought follows Sean Bowden in The Priority 
of Events, ultimately arguing that Deleuze constructs the ontologically primi-
tive event by extracting problems from «a hybrid family of concepts» (Bowden 
2011, 244). In this book, Deleuze’s borrowings from the Stoics, Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz, Albert Lautman, Gilbert Simondon, structuralism, and psychoanalysis 
come to light. The red thread, however, remains the demonstration that events 
are impersonal ontological antecedents, that is to say, that substance entirely 
derives from them.
Let us look at one definition of the event: «The event is specifically 
the cut of production or becoming, what creates or generates something new» 
(Crockett 2013, 59). This definition sees the event of sense as a freeze-frame of a 
constitutive motion toward a novelty, the critical mass reached in a generative 
procedure, the brink of emergence. Apart from a processual definition, however, 
the event sports a number of characteristics that position it within a cosmolo-
gy that affirms its impersonal status as an underlying liminality that conditions 
both the order of representation and its effects. The present paper extracts these, 
across a number of event theories, and shows how the event is systematically 
defined as an impassive extra-ontological entity through its relation to being. In 
doing this, I show how the event is construed in terms of its liminal and pre-per-
sonal status. That is to say, the discussed event theories create a world picture in 
which the event is the impersonal superaddition to being, signaling that we have 
reached the brink of emergence, but also the constitution of the order of rep-
resentation. An event here is the intermediary, the interface, the groundlessness 
between world regions, the in-between, or the extra-categorical element. In this 
way, the impersonal event becomes the protagonist of a superadditive cosmolo-
gy wherein it conditions the very emergence of constituted entities. Herein, the 
event becomes the impassive linkage between regions of being (Heidegger), or 
the realm preceding, underlying, and generating being (Whitehead and Deleuze). 
In what follows, then, I look at the story of the event of sense from a cosmologi-
cal vantage point and explore this pre-personal superadditive status.
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Ereignis in Heidegger: The Event of Appropriation
Let me begin with a philosophy that posits the event in the same realm as 
its groundwork of emergence – be it substance, being, or a world region. It is 
questionable whether Heidegger’s ‘Ereignis’ could be translated or interpret-
ed as ‘event’ at all. Yet the term manifests several characteristics that bear a 
close resemblance to Deleuze’s ‘événement’. Heidegger’s ‘Ereignis’, understood 
as ‘appropriation’, already demonstrates the relational and emergent features 
of Deleuze’s event. Viewed in the light of Hedeigger’s ontological question-
ing, it would not be counterintuitive to posit ‘Ereignis’ as the opening, cleav-
age, and clearing – all of them spatial terms – whereby being flashes itself into a 
world. A temporal tinge is given by the etymological proximity with ‘Auge’ and 
‘Augenblick’ (see McNeill 2001), the showing of being in the blink of an eye. The 
various debates on the term’s translation are myriad. ‘Propriation’ as favoured 
by Stuart Elden, ‘appropriation’, 1 ‘enowning’, 2 and 
‘the event of appropriation’ 3 (Heidegger 1969, 31) 
touch on the “personal” component of being (“one’s 
own”), but also on that of propriety. 4 An arguable 
reference to Being and Time’s terms ‘Eigentlichkeit’ 
and ‘Uneigentlichkeit’ (Heidegger 1996) also exists. 5 
What is generally agreed upon, however, is that 
‘Ereignis’, itself an immediacy and a gesture of given-
ness, foregrounds a relationality.
In clarifying this, one could recall the lec-
ture On Time and Being (1962; see Heidegger 1978). 
Here Heidegger makes clear that ‘Ereignis’ does not 
offer yet another definition of being. What he as-
serts is that ‘Ereignis’ «is to be thought in such a 
way that it can neither be retained as being nor as 
time. It is, so to speak, a “neutrale tantum”, the neu-
tral ‘and’ in the title On Time and Being (Heidegger 
1978, 43). This impassive, non-belonging, intermedi-
ary and yet regulative character is also evident in 
the event in Deleuze. Moreover, as Heidegger’s event 
as a moment of appropriation flashes through, a vir-
tuality (being) is made actual (time). Hereby, be-
ing is contracted into a temporality, and the event 
of appropriation is the impassive force that carries 
the transition. The following passage throws light 
on Heidegger’s decision to posit Ereignis, or appro-
priation, as the condition of possibility of an occur-
rence. Here it operates as the relational constituent 
that contracts being into a spatial and a temporal re-
gion, that is to say, into a finitudinal entity. It is at 
this point that Ereignis, a negotiator between the re-
gions of a world, shows its liminal nature:
Ereignis will be translated as Appropriation or event of Appropriation. One 
should bear in mind, however, that “event” is not simply an occurrence, but 
that which makes any occurrence possible. What this word names can be 
1 This was the term used in 
the translation of the lectu-
re On Time and Being (1962). 
See Heidegger (1978).
2 In a translation proposed by 
Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad, 
this view on ‘Ereignis’ fore-
grounds its property to ari-
se, appear, come into one’s self. 
The translation was applied in 
Contributions to Philosophy (From 
Enowning). See Heidegger (1999).
3 ‘Ereignis’ as ‘the event of ap-
propriation’ was the term chosen 
for Stambaugh’s 1969 transla-
tion of the essay The Principle of 
Identity. ‘Ereignis’ was introduced 
here for the first time. An earlier 
translation, Leidecker’s Essays in 
Metaphysics: Identity and Difference 
(1960) picks the term ‘concern’ as 
it alludes to a relational and yet di-
stinguishing feature. This is highly 
interesting not least in view of the 
fact that Deleuze also insists on 
the status of his ontological prota-
gonist, sense, as “the object of fun-
damental care” in Logic of Sense.
4 Here ‘propriate’ appe-
ars in the sense of “to gi-
ve the truth of something”.
5 In Being and Time, this dyad could 
be understood as ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘inauthenticity’, but also as 
pertaining to ‘Ereignis’ in its ca-
pacity to address the ‘proper’ and 
the ‘improper’ and thus grope at 
the same notion of ‘propriety’.
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thought now only in the light of what becomes manifest in our looking ahe-
ad toward Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to which 
time and Being belong. We have called both — Being and time — matters. 
The ‘and’ between them left their relation to each other indeterminate. (19)
Here the ontological primacy of event over being which Deleuze makes central 
to his own work is already prefigured. The event is the ground of intedetermina-
cy between being and time, but also that which contracts being into a (human) 
finitude, an impersonal intermediary that makes being personal. In addition, here 
Heidegger covertly hints at the event’s status as an unnamable, as Ereignis does 
not manifest itself in being and does not belong to time. Rather, while touching 
on both and effecting a transmission, its status in relation to being and time re-
mains undecided.
While the early work Being and Time (Heidegger 1996) offers a tem-
poral scaffold of being that is primary to spatial relations, Ereignis from the later 
lectures constitutes a space dominant. As a spatial concept, it is defined not only 
as a locale, but also as the condition of possibility of a locality emerging between 
being and time – the locality that human finitude is. Here we have an example 
of something pre-personal – the impassive force of a relation – that creates a 
space for the emergence of finitudinal subjectivity. As has been recently shown, 
«Heidegger’s notion of the event is first and foremost spatial: it denotes a site, a 
place of openness for the spatial differentiation and gathering of things, includ-
ing human dwelling, to take place» (Joronen 2013, 627). In the essay The Origin 
of the Work of Art (Heidegger 2001b), the notion of the fourfold constitution of 
Ereignis, the event of revealing, also carries traces of spatiality. Its manifesta-
tion as a clearing (Lichtung) is the result of the interplay of the constitutive ele-
ments of the fourfold – namely humans (finitude), unformed matter or substance 
(earth), paradigms (divinities), and the open (sky). Not only are these represent-
ed by spatial metaphors, but they also are reminiscent of Deleuze’s locating the 
event on the brittle surface between the monsters of the depth and the daemons 
of the heights. It is on this surface that the divergent regions are appropriated 
and made available to one another. As a middle stretching toward two disparate 
regions, this surface also offers ground for the negotiation between the univer-
sal and the particular, the infinite and the individual.
Ereignis as appropriation, however, remains the leitmotif of the lecture 
On Time and Being. On providing the link between finitude and being, Heidegger 
offers a movement of transmission. The latter is «a non-static process» in which 
a relationship is established in such a way that the relation and the reciprocity 
issued therewith is «more fundamental than what is related» (Heidegger 1978, 
X). What Heidegger, following an attempt to think of being without beings, molds 
out of this is «an occurrence without reference to a thing occurring» (X). In this 
line of thought, the expression “appropriation appropriates” alludes to the im-
passive and transmitting character of the deleuzian event. Ereignis clears a space 
wherein finitude and the limitless can be appropriated for one another. Positing 
«Being as presence and […] time as the realm of the open» (19), Heidegger lays 
out a region where they can belong together.
Appropriation 6 carries further characteris-
tics of the impersonal and is described in similarly 
elusive language: «However: Appropriation neither 
is, nor is Appropriation there. […] What remains to be 
6 Similar to the event in Deleuze, 
appropriation appears to have en-
gaged Heidegger increasingly 
over the years. This is documen-
ted in several earlier writings, 
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said? Only this: Appropriation appropriates» (24). In 
this passage, one increasingly begins to sense the 
proximity between Heidegger’s “appropriation” and 
Deleuze’s “événement”. First, the event in Heidegger 
aligns with a certain manifestation of being, mak-
ing the concept an ontological primate with regard 
to a world and its phenomena. Second, its relation-
al role as an impassive transmissive component be-
tween two ontologically disparate regions is foregrounded and made primary 
too. Further still, this ontological primacy is underlined through the term’s cat-
egorical distinctness from objects or properties 7 as 
well as from the terms it relates. Appropriation is not 
spatial, nor is it temporal, although it lends itself to 
descriptions through the mentioned terms. Neither 
is it a “thing”. Appropriation is entirely immanent, as 
it remains within itself, and neutral, without serving 
as a point of reference or itself referencing anything 
beyond its own appropriative action.
While all this reminds us of Quentin 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude and its attack on corre-
lationism, a path toward the dissolution of that same 
correlationist stance opens here. ‘Appropriation’ of-
fers a relation that is primarily defined through the 
act of relating. Heidegger couches his statement in 
platonist terms. He ultimately affirms that Ereignis is 
not of a phenomenal nature and cannot be thought 
in terms of phenomena. It has nothing to say about 
them. More importantly, Heidegger foregrounds the 
presence of appropriation as an impersonal force, 
that which presences, an openness that appears, a 
showing of a revelatory character. Rather than being 
the explication of what is already given, the relation 
of appropriation is dynamic, constituting a transmis-
sion and a gesture of production. It is within this im-
passive transmission that the regions of a world, but 
also finitude and being, become given to one another. 
The expressions “openness”, “clearing”, and “shining 
forth” poetically capture this givenness. They testify to the emergence of an or-
der that is irrelevant to the world of phenomena, thus acquiring the status of an 
outside, yet an order which is immanent to or embedded in the given.
Heidegger’s Ereignis thus shows itself as an impassive connective com-
ponent that is other than being, yet facilitates an access to being and renders its 
region visible. It is construed as an openness between regions and the linkage 
between the universal and the particular, the infinite and finitude. The event’s 
liminality becomes manifest in a spatiality trope: it is a “clearing” (The Origin of 
the Work of Art) and a “bridge” (Building, Dwelling, Thinking). In this capacity, it is 
systematically construed as an event of passage and a negotiator between dis-
parate world regions. This relationality becomes the condition for the commu-
nication between divergent world regions to take place. At the same time, the 
event is different in texture from the world regions it brings together and in-
such as in Letter on Humanism 
(Heidegger 2010), a lecture cour-
se dated 1949 and bearing the 
name Insight into That Which Is 
and later published as the The 
Thing (see Heidegger 2001c) and 
Das Gestell [Lectures and Essays 
(1954)], as well as in Identity and 
Difference (Heidegger 1969).
7 In his account of contemporary 
continental philosophy, D’Amico 
(1999) reminds us that the que-
stion of Dasein is indifferent to 
questions of truth and falseness 
as encountered in the world (whi-
ch Deleuze terms “denotation”). 
The question of representation, he 
notes, remains an ontic one, that 
is to say, one that does not help us 
in encountering being. In a sense, 
Deleuze’s notion of the event as in-
different to reference-informed no-
tions of truth replicates this move. 
This becomes all the more visible 
if we view D’Amico’s statement 
through the lenses of Bowden’s 
thesis about the ontological pri-
ority of events: «Global skeptici-
sm concerning whether access to 
the external world is even possi-
ble, let alone reliable, is an ontic 
topic. Heidegger thinks any wor-
ries about these physical proces-
ses leave the question of being 
unanswered, since that question 
neither depends upon nor presup-
poses reliable access. For instance, 
the possibility that representa-
tions of the world might “misfire” 
due to deviant causal processes is 
not an ontological problem, thou-
gh it may be a significant ontic one. 
Even given such a massive misfire, 
Dasein encounters being. […] [F]
undamental ontology is prior to epi-
stemology» (D’Amico 1999, 60).
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forms. It differs from the worlds to which it relates, becoming their superaddi-
tion. From this position, it is not determined in terms of world regions, nor does 
it pertain to world regions in the proper sense. The event of appropriation is an 
impersonal force solely defined by its appropriative action and its role as a pas-
sage for being.
Whitehead and the Locus of Creation
Yet another event cosmology presents itself in the section “What is an event?” of 
Deleuze’s The Fold (1993, 76-85). Here Deleuze explicitly names one antecedent 
of his event theory, Whitehead. Rather than dealing with temporal and relation-
al aspects of the term as in The Logic of Sense, this inquiry probes into a positive 
description as well as into the conditions of possibility of an event. On stating 
that events are «produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only under the 
condition that a sort of screen intervenes» (76), the philosopher takes us back 
to Logic’s notion of the genesis of representation. It is the subtle transformative 
coloration of the impassive event – a change of state, an alteration following an 
action – that preconditions the emergence of a world region. “Chaotic multiplic-
ities” are organized by virtue of this screen, «a formless elastic membrane, an 
electromagnetic field» (76). This transformative component recomposes bodies 
and the multiplicity of interrelations into which bodies enter, the result being a 
singular occurrence.
Exactly this switch from the universal (chaotic multiplicity) to the par-
ticular (finitude) engages Deleuze. Again, what perplexes is the participatory 
role of the event: it is immanent to each particularity, yet leaving it individual 
and distinct. The paradox of being simultaneously within and without becomes 
manifest yet again. Herein Spinoza’s solution to theological debates about the 
transition from substance to finite modes, from one to many, comes to the fore. 
This query, in its most abstract form, translates into the event structure as a cos-
mological given. Rather than following a line of descent from substance to fi-
nite modes, Deleuze chooses to start from the pre-representational “depths” as 
«series of wholes and parts that appear chaotic to us» (76). These are regions 
of pre-propositional, pre-reflective bodily interfusions: «Chaos would be a pure 
Many, a purely disjunctive diversity, while the something is a One, not a pregiv-
en unity, but instead the indefinite article that designates a certain singularity» 
(76). This chaos is a pure possibility, a sum of potent essences striving toward 
existence, a pre-personal realm of ongoing constitution. Herein, what comes to 
the fore is a screen out of which the multitude of chaos becomes individuated 
to finally consolidate into a maximally concrete entitiy, a thisness. A “metaphys-
ical surface” (Deleuze 1990, 125), a “transcendental field” (102) or “a plane of im-
manence” (Deleuze & Parnet 1977, 147) are the guises under which this differ-
ential screen of the impersonal event operates. The deleuzian screen carries the 
event’s transformative faculty and extracts particulars out of the virtual.
This notion of events as intermediaries between one and many, univer-
sals and particulars, substance and finite modes, or bodily mixtures and prop-
ositions is infinitely liberating inasmuch as it postulates that the impersonal 
event is the basic condition for an emergence within a world. According to this 
view, evental regions are the sieve through which the undifferentiated “depth-
less shadows” of potentiality are made actual. A non-existent subsistence, the 
deleuzian event appears to pose as a condition of possibility for all existent enti-
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ties. According to this model, all finite modes within a world, having undergone 
the process of the expression of substance, constitute events. Unlike other influ-
ential theories that enlist essential transformation, uniqueness, or significance 
as the prerequisites for an event, within this cosmology everything is an event. 
Namely, actualized entities are inherently transformative, unique, and significant.
Evading a scenario of non-differentiation requires a distinction that 
would allow the event to encompass everything, but still allow for differences. 
In working out this quandary, Deleuze introduces two components borrowed 
from Whitehead. They are extension and intension. The former is an element that 
Deleuze (1993, 77) detects in both Whitehead’s and Leibniz’s definitions of the 
event. Extension is the stretching of one component over a series of components. 
It ensures continuity within an entity by dint of gluing together various stages of 
individuation. Intension, in turn, brings forth Spinoza’s notion of power as a ques-
tion of degrees or intensity. 8 Thus, the event extends 
down the chain toward the constitution of individ-
ual entities until the motion arrives at the finitudi-
nal. On motioning toward greater concreteness, the 
event becomes a matter of degrees, a fixture of an existent’s intensity. Here one 
encounters degrees of “thisnesses”, that is, entities which are distinct from one 
another insofar as they demonstrate different levels of definiteness and intensi-
ty. While extensions safeguard the rule of univocity, intensions supply definite-
ness at every step. Having descended to the finite modes, the virtual substance 
has become more pronounced. A thing has become this thing, «no longer the in-
definite article, but the demonstrative pronoun» (78).
Once the movement has reached this stage of definiteness, Deleuze 
evokes Whitehead’s theory of prehensions. With this, a transition from defi-
niteness to the personal takes place. This transition shows how an existent 
entity can participate in substance, be itself composed of parts (properties) 
that guarantee its distinctness, and simultaneously generate an extra com-
ponent. Metaphorically speaking, this extra component is another interme-
diary between the actual entity and the expression of its potentiality in the 
substance. “Prehension” offers a further level of individuation that can be de-
scribed as the awareness of “being given”. It also entails an entity’s recogni-
tion of a given that simultaneously also participates in the onto-phenomeno-
logical awareness: «It is the element of pure givenness in this act; experience 
as the having of an object» (Hartshorne 1963, 167). This moment confirms the 
relational character of an event since an entity is always prehended by others 
and itself prehends.
Apart from being a sum of its relations to given entities that it prehends, 
a prehended particularity also entails a link between the past of the prehended 
and its present set of relations. This concoction of “causal efficacy” and “connect-
edness”, in which «the occurence of events strictly entails that of those events 
which they prehend» (169) amounts to the actuality of a particular event. It, 
however, offers a unique, personal way of unifying the many prehensions of past 
experiences into a new actual One. This act, to Whitehead, is not deterministic, 
but creative. Here Whitehead demonstrates how the evolvement of substance 
from one to many reaches a phase of involvement wherein a second move-
ment, from many to one, carries on, but on the level of a substance that is far 
more refined and individuated. This process overlaps with deleuzian “becoming” 
(Deleuze 1993, 78).
8 See the section “What Can A 
Body Do?” (Deleuze 2005, 217-235).
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At this point, the movement of the event has arrived at its most actual 
and individualized form. Then, the phase of substance’s evolvement is concluded 
by allowing the many to fold back into a one – this time a highly differentiated, 
creatively generated one. Here Deleuze points out another faculty of the event. 
Speaking with Whitehead, he calls this faculty an “ingression”, describing the in-
clusion of impassive “eternal objects” in the now maximally concretized event 
structure:
While prehensions are always current forms (a prehension is a potential 
only in respect to another current prehension), eternal objects are pure 
Possibilities that are realized in fluvia, but also pure Virtualities that are 
actualized in prehensions. That is why a prehension does not grasp other 
prehensions without apprehending eternal objects (properly, conceptual 
feeling). Eternal objects produce ingression in the event. (79)
Actuality or discreteness is now pervaded by an element that could be called 
either a whiteheadian “eternal object” or deleuzian “virtuality”, inasmuch as it 
evokes “pure potentials” or “potentials for the process of becoming” (Whitehead 
1985, 29). Each actual occurrence implies the actualization of certain potentiali-
ties. In this arrangement, actual entities are marked by the “ingression” of select-
ed eternal objects: «The term ‘ingression’ refers to the particular mode in which 
the potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual entity, con-
tributing to the definiteness of that actual entity» (23).
It is at these points of intersection that an event emerges. A most con-
crete individual entity takes shape, having folded the multiplicity back into a 
new, creatively constituted one. Once its relations as a prehended entity and 
a cluster of the objects it prehends are established within the flux of becom-
ing-actual, these entities are also pervaded by virtual eternal objects which be-
come additive to their definiteness. They, however, are optional in character. An 
ingression may or may not occur. In other words, one 
could call an eternal object the entity’s superaddi, 9 
the impersonal component that further enriches or 
defines its particular character without being nec-
essary to its formation. This move implies a double 
logic of simultaneous immanence and transcendence. On the one hand, the con-
ceptual abstractions, universals or virtualities that the eternal objects are, ap-
pear to pervade the individual entities from “without”, that is, «pure Virtualities 
that are actualised in prehensions» (Deleuze 1993, 79). On the other hand, the 
eternal objects are not aprioristic inasmuch as they are immanent to the flux of 
prehensions that experience is. In this sense, they are to remain strictly “within”.
A double movement is formed in this way. First, we have the move-
ment from impassive virtualities to most concrete finite modes, an act within 
which substance evolves expressing itself. Substance descends from indetermi-
nacy toward the most concrete, personal determination. A counteracting move-
ment also issues forth, however. Opposite to the movement from one to many, 
from potentiality to actuality, actualization follows a trajectory of involvement, 
contracting the many into one. The impassive “eternal objects” play a vital role 
here as they are, in turn, the expressions of the derived actualities. At this inter-
section, deleuzian events surface again in the process of actualization. They do 
9 See Agamben’s discussion 
on the definition of beatitu-
de in Duns Scotus in the excur-
sus Halos (Agamben, 2003a).
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so not as actualizations – as the incorporation of the virtual into the actual, the 
universal into the particular and so on – but in the form of supra-existents or su-
peradditive subsistences. In representing the “envisagement” of eternal objects 
(Whitehead 1985, 44), they gesture back toward the virtualities.
Deleuzian events emerge out of this paradoxical point of intersection 
between “within” and “without” as «instantaneous productions intrinsic to in-
teractions between various kinds of forces» (Stagoll 2005, 89) and «changes 
[…] subsisting as pure virtualities» (89) distinguishable only insofar as they can 
be incarnated in a body or a state. Events here are the articulation of the dif-
ference between transcendence and immanence insofar as they occur on an in-
terface that marks the entering of eternal objects into the flux of experience 
(“withoutness”), whereby experience itself is a multiplicity of interrelated pre-
hensions (“withinness”). This infusion of potentials (or forms and patterns) into 
an already maximally concretized entity can be described in the terminology of 
Duns Scotus. It is a “halo”, an impersonal superadditive component whose char-
acter is not substantial, but rather that of an enhancement, an intensification. 
Metaphorically speaking, in receiving eternal objects, the finitudinal gestures 
back to the forms and potentials in a way that reminds us of the inherence of 
the deleuzian event: «An eternal object is always a potentiality for actual enti-
ties; but in itself, as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical in-
gression in any particular actual entity of the temporal world» (Whitehead 1985, 
44). Similarly, the event is neutrality itself, an impassive inherence, whereas only 
bodies remain impassioned and thus describable in terms of ethical evaluation. 
Switching to an ontological vocabulary and to Deleuze’s words, I can now addi-
tionally define an impassive event as a flush of potentialities into a substance 
taken to its maximal level of concreteness in the finite modes. There the event 
similarly “insists” and “subsists” while being non-actual, practically a non-exist-
ent. While maximally distinct, when illuminated by an event, an entity turns to 
beckon toward its virtuality.
The superadditive status of the event here shows itself on several lev-
els. First, it is by dint of Whitehead’s “prehension” that relationality is secured 
in the process of individuation. Second, in the process of individuation, a gener-
ative motion from forms and potentials to finitude issues forth. Events, within 
this model, function as an impassive screen separating and articulating the dif-
ference between virtuality and actuality. Herein, they are the limit that marks 
an entity’s entry into being. Third, in “ingression” one confronts an actuality that 
gestures back toward the virtual region. In all three cases, we have to do with re-
gions of emptiness. These impassive regions, while not pertaining to being, open 
up as a space for being’s articulation.
The Event and Its Cosmology
From this short collection of event ontologies, it becomes evident that two no-
tions run across contesting theories. The first is the notion of impassive limi-
nality. Herein, the ontological portrait of events is invariably marked by tropes 
alluding to a transmission, intermediariness, a passage, a transition, or a trans-
formation indifferent to ‘corporeal’ world regions. As a cosmological category, 
the event itself becomes a carrier of intermediary characteristics. Across diver-
gent event ontologies, the event is an empty centre that becomes a playground 
for the interfusions of finitude and the infinite. Heidegger makes the event the 
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capture of appropriative action, and Whitehead locates it on the screen sepa-
rating virtual and actual. The second notion derives from the first and can be ex-
plained with the trope of the “superadditive”. In its relation to being, the event 
acts as a super-addition. It is non-existent, adjacent, non-essential to the flow of 
representation, yet constitutive of it as it makes a being that which it is.
Heidegger’s appropriation acts as a point of intersection between the 
regions of a world, but also as the place securing the continuity and transition 
between divergent worlds. Herein Ereignis positions itself as the condition of 
possibility of an occurrence. It is a neutral “and” negotiating a world’s disparate 
regions. While being and time are “matters”, the intermediary “and” regulates 
their relationship. Offering a ground of indeterminacy, it acts as an in-between 
and a messenger between worlds. Ereignis as appropriation thus puts on display 
both the primacy of the relation and the relation’s transmissive status as a back-
drop of immanence. Against this backdrop, the disparate regions of a world be-
come present to one another in the dynamic, non-referential transmission of a 
relation.
Encountered in Heidegger, this dynamic and motion-infused protago-
nist is also present in the event theories of Whitehead and Deleuze. Here the 
event is shown to “extend over” a region marking the transition from infinite 
substance to finite modes. An event’s potential to impart creativity is also locat-
ed in the supperadditive phenomena of becoming-intense (“intension”) and be-
coming-personal (“prehension”). Lastly, Whitehead’s “ingression”, the infusion of 
eternal objects or virtuality into an already actual entity, also affirms the kind of 
ontology governed by connective, relational, transmissive, and reciprocal prop-
erties. Herein an event operates as a “screen” by dint of which being is contract-
ed into the finitudinal and multiplicities into the maximally individual. Virtual 
and actual coalesce while remaining open to one another.
According to the listed event ontologies, the event almost uniformly 
acts as an impersonal inherence thought of in relation to being, but not amount-
ing to a form of being or being definable in ways that include being. Its status 
as an in-between, a non-existent, transformative, transmissive constituent and 
a relation could not be more emphasized throughout the discussed theories. 
Spatiotemporal, but not quite, a change in substance but not a substance itself, 
uniquely concrete, but also maximally abstract – the singular event is almost uni-
formly described in the language of apophatic theology. An event’s emergence 
is a condition for the emergence of a world. According to this understanding, 
everything is an event. Herewith the event becomes a cosmological category. 
This event assumes form on the intersection between universals and particu-
lars wherein it gestures back to its own virtuality. The event is both “within” and 
“without”. As a liminal phenomenon, the event thus continually articulates the 
fissure between immanence and transcendence, “withinness” and “withoutness”.
The Superadditive
With the introduction of the superadditive, I offer a short exposition that has 
the aim to emphasize the constitutive role of impassivity and emptiness in this 
cosmology. According to this view, it is the vacuity between conceptual entities 
that adds up to the shaping of world regions. The place of an event’s occurrence 
is this nominal “groundlessness” between the disparate regions of the virtual 
and the actual. This position or, better still, non-position of the event of sense 
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can be aligned with Heidegger’s image of a bridge as the gathering place for the 
fourfold in the essay Building, Dwelling, Thinking (Heidegger 2001a). Here, the 
paradox of the non-locatability of a location and the mutual conditioning of both 
constitutive components and constitution are brought to light:
To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold 
in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a 
location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before 
the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along 
the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be a 
location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge does not first 
come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only 
by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in 
such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined 
the localities and ways by which a space is provided for. (Heidegger 2001a, 
151-152)
Another way of coming closer to thinking this non-locatable locale, the event of 
sense, and the paradoxical relationship it maintains with the realms of virtual-
ity and actuality, opens up with Giorgio Agamben’s discussion in the excursus 
Ease. Here the author isolates “ease” as the proper name of this unrepresentable 
locale:
The term ‘ease’ in fact designates, according to its etymology, the space 
adjacent (ad-jacens, adjacentia), the empty place where each can move fre-
ely, in a semantic constellation where spatial proximity borders on oppor-
tune time (ad-agio, moving at ease) and convenience borders on the cor-
rect relation. The Provençal poets (whose songs first introduce the term into 
Romance languages in the form aizi, aizimen) make ease a terminus tech-
nicus in their poetics, designating the very place of love. Or better, it desi-
gnates not so much the place of love, but rather love as the experience of 
taking-place in awhatever singularity. (Agamben 2003b, 24-25)
Similarly, rather than attaching to a being, the event of sense takes place in an 
adjacent region, receiving infusions from and negotiating the ground between 
the realms of being and non-being. In seeing the event as an extra-being, the 
mentioned event ontologies reinstate its “adjacent” status in a manner similar 
to Agamben’s treatment of the term ‘ease’. Ease is the emptiness between bod-
ies, yet this emptiness is a constitutive one. It transforms them and creates a 
groundlessness that facilitates an emergence. Herein, the event’s double work 
as a “withinness” that simultaneously points beyond itself, a “withoutness”, des-
ignates the very place where transformation occurs. This transformation is to be 
understood as an impersonal force, as the event of taking place of any haecceity. 
In other words, with regard to its actualization, the event of sense remains neu-
tral while plunged in maximally concrete regions.
What an event effects, however, is across and beyond signification. 
Oftentimes it merely offers us a meinongian non-existing entity. Where events 
are most expressive, they ultimately fail to signify. In this way, events could be 
said to function as extra-beings or superaddi: «When nothing essential can be 
added […] there is, however, something that can be added in surplus (superaddi), 
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an “accidental reward that is added to the essential”, that is not necessary to be-
atitude and does not alter it substantially, but that simply makes it more brilliant 
(clarior)” (54). Following the analogy taken from Giorgio Agamben’s essay Halo 
(Agamben 2003a), explaining the inessential but ultimately individuating char-
acter of a halo, let us recall the deleuzian rhetoric that surrounds the expressed 
and its additive, inessential, but world-shaping character:
The halo is not a quid, a property or an essence that is added to beatitude: 
It is an absolutely inessential supplement. […] The halo is […] the individua-
tion of a beatitude, the becoming singular of that which is perfect. […] [T]his 
individuaton does not imply the addition of a new essence or a change in its 
nature, but rather its singular completion […] the singularity here is not a fi-
nal determination of being, but an unraveling or an undetermination of its 
limits: a paradoxical individuation by indetermination. […] One can think of 
the halo, in this sense, as a zone in which possibility and reality, potentiality 
and actuality, become indistinguishable. The being that has reached its end 
and has thus consumed all of its possibilities thus receives as a gift a sup-
plementary possibility. (55-56)
The expressed, very much like a halo, envelops representational world regions. It 
is supra-logical, non-corporeal, and evades structures of resemblance or recog-
nition. A halo is what is most unnecessary, a superaddi, an excess of beatitude 
within an already complete being. Yet a halo is also what illuminates the being it 
is additive to, thus making this particular being shine forth. Similarly, an event is 
what is invisible, superfluous, and yet the one facet that gives a finishing edge 
to the given, despite its already available wholesomeness. The empty site of the 
event makes being not only more intensified but also truly creative – not only 
working within prefigured patterns, but exceeding them and becoming additive 
to the given. When incorporated in world regions, the event works as an incor-
poreal envelopment intensifying bodies, bringing them to what they can become.
Conclusion
This paper showed how the ontological portrait of the event was constructed in 
terms of impassivity and exclusion. The problematic classification of the evental 
region has made philosophers give it a status of an extra-ontological entity. Its 
habitat – outside of being – makes the event a messenger between worlds, an 
impersonal force that alters the fabric of being. The event disrupts the habitual 
texture of a given world region, and carries the transition between levels of be-
ing such as virtuality and actuality, the infinite and a finitude. The event is an in-
termediary, a negotiator between disparate world regions, and it is only in this 
connective activity that a world – an actualized entity – comes to being. At the 
same time, an event has the character of an anomaly as it cannot be peacefully 
incorporated into being. Rather than of being, the event is part of a superaddi-
tive cosmology. It attests to the groundlessness between world regions and to 
the constitutive zest of this groundlessness. Here, the becoming of being takes 
place in the impersonal, that is, in an extra-ontological adjacent region.
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